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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Steven D. Benjamin*
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A police officer's detention of a citizen is a "seizure" of the per-
son for purposes of the fourth amendment, and must be reasonable
in light of the totality of the circumstances.1 Significant police en-
counters fall into two categories-the brief investigatory detention
and the more intrusive, full-blown arrest.2
The prerequisites for these two types of stops differ. Before a
police officer makes an investigative detention, he must have a rea-
sonable suspicion that the person to be stopped "is, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity."3 Before an officer may effect a
warrantless arrest, he must have probable cause to believe that the
person has committed a felony.4 When the legality of the seizure is
challenged, courts characterize the detention and assess the under-
lying justification. If the court finds that the circumstances did not
justify the detention, all information or evidence obtained as a re-
sult is subject to supression.5
The characterization is sometimes difficult to make. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently refused to establish a
"bright line" rule to determine whether a stop is an investigatory
* Criminal Defense Lawyer, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1976, East Carolina University;
J.D., 1979, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234
Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 369
S.E.2d 423 (1988).
2. A third category is the consensual encounter requiring no objective justification. See
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
3. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop and further
investigation." Id. at 21; see also Taylor, 6 Va. App. at 388, 369 S.E.2d at 423.
4. "The test of constitutional validity is whether at the moment of arrest the arresting
officer had knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a reasonable man in
believing that an offense has been committed." Bryson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87,
175 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1970); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp.
1988).
5. See, e.g., Zimmerman, 234 Va. 609, 363 S.E.2d 708 (1988); Taylor, 6 Va. App. at 389,
369 S.E.2d at 423.
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detention or an arrest.6 Courts consider the facts of each case, in
the context of "common sense and ordinary human experience,"
to determine whether the nature of the stop was so intrusive as to
require a showing of probable cause."
These issues arose in several cases decided by the Virginia Su-
preme Court and Virginia Court of Appeals this past year. In
DePriest v. Commonwealth,9 the issue was whether the initial de-
tention by the police was an arrest or an investigatory detention. A
narcotics detective had observed a sequence of events over a three
and one-half hour period, which, in conjunction with his experi-
ence and training as a narcotics officer, caused him to suspect that
the defendant and his companion were engaged in drug transac-
tions. Watching the individuals leave their location, the detective
directed other officers by radio to detain and search both people.
When the detective arrived at the place where the other officers
had detained the defendant and his companion, he retrieved drugs
from the pocket of the companion and then arrested the defend-
ant. A search of the defendant conducted pursuant to his arrest
revealed several bags of heroin. 10
The defendant moved to suppress the heroin. He conceded that
his initial detention was a lawful Terry" stop, at least until a pat-
down by the officers revealed no weapons. He argued that the stop
became an arrest, unsupported by probable cause, when the of-
ficers continued to detain him until the detective arrived. He ar-
gued further that because he was unlawfully detained at the time
the discovery was made, the discovery could not establish probable
cause for a subsequent arrest.12
The court ruled that the detective's initial observations and con-
clusions gave rise only to a suspicion of criminal activity, and were
not sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest.' But probable
6. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 359 S.E.2d 836 (1987).
9. 4 Va. App. 577, 359 S.E.2d 540 (1987).
10. Id. at 579-81, 359 S.E.2d at 541-42.
11. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
12. DePriest, 4 Va. App. at 582, 359 S.E.2d at 542.
13. Id. at 585, 359 S.E.2d at 544. Several factors were relevant. First, the detective did
not observe an exchange of narcotics or an object which he believed to be narcotics. Second,
there was no evidence that the area under surveillance was known for drug trafficking. Id.;
see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Third, there was no evidence that
the transactions were furtive. DePriest, 4 Va. App. at 585, 359 S.E.2d at 544.
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cause was not required, because the court characterized the deten-
tion as investigatory.14 Because the defendant was lawfully de-
tained at the time the detective discovered drugs on the defend-
ant's companion, and the discovery of the drugs provided sufficient
probable cause to arrest, his subsequent warrantless arrest was
valid.15 It followed, then, that the subsequent search incident to
arrest was also valid."6
In contrast, the police officer's observations in Zimmerman v.
Commonwealth were not sufficient to establish even reasonable
suspicion. The officer had seen the defendant pull his car over and
allow a passenger to exit. The passenger approached the police of-
ficer and asked for directions. The passenger returned to the car,
getting in behind the wheel while the defendant slid over into the
passenger seat. The passenger then drove the car in a different di-
rection than had been given by the officer. 8 His suspicions
aroused, the police officer stopped the car, obtained the defend-
ant's name and learned that he had been adjudicated a habitual
offender. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of
his identity, arguing that the police officer had insufficient basis to
justify the stop. 9 The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, ruling that
the conduct "viewed as a whole, demonstrates innocent, lawful
conduct not a basis for a reasonable suspicion of illegal, criminal
conduct."2 o
14. DePriest, 4 Va. App. at 586, 359 S.E.2d at 544. Did the court finesse this conclusion?
The court reasoned that the detective's observations "led him to request that other officers
detain [the defendant and his companion] until he could arrive to investigate his reasonable
suspicion that the two men were selling narcotics." Id. The detective, however, had testified
as follows: "I directed the officers to detain them based on my observations and I would
respond and I also directed the officers to search both individuals." Id. at 581, 359 S.E.2d at
541. Once the detective arrived at the scene, he searched the pockets of the companion and
found drugs. Id. at 581, 359 S.E.2d at 541-42.
15. Id. at 588, 359 S.E.2d at 546.
16. Id.
17. 234 Va. 609, 363 S.E.2d 708 (1988).
18. Id. at 610-11, 363 S.E.2d at 709.
19. Id. at 611, 363 S.E.2d at 709.
20. Id. at 612, 363 S.E.2d at 709-10. The court distinguished United States v. Arias, 678
F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982) and United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463 (1980). In Crews, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's refusal to
suppress an in-court identification which the defendant argued was the result of his illegal
arrest. The distinguishing point is that in Crews, the police knew the defendant's identity
and suspected his involvement in the crimes for which he was charged prior to his arrest. In
Zimmerman, the defendant's identity and connection with unlawful activity (driving), were
not known until the officer detained the defendant unlawfully. Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 609,
363 S.E.2d at 710; see also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 9 Va. Cir. 242 (Alexandria 1987).
19881 549
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Perhaps the most significant decision of the Virginia Court of
Appeals, certainly with respect to the fourth amendment, was Tay-
lor v. Commonwealth,21 the "drug courier profile" case. A Chester-
field County police officer observed a car northbound on Interstate
95 which had characteristics consistent with a drug courier profile
taught by the Virginia State Police. The officer followed the vehi-
cle for approximately five miles, noticing that the speed, though at
or under the speed limit, varied, and that the occupants glanced at
him in a nervous fashion. The car was stopped and the occupants
consented to a search of the vehicle. The occupants were arrested
when the officer found 173 pounds of marijuana in the trunk.2
The only issue before the court was whether the police were au-
thorized to stop the vehicle.23 The court restated the applicable
law from Terry to Cortez, requiring a particularized suspicion. The
court acknowledged that "a trained law enforcement officer may
identify criminal behavior which would appear innocent to an un-
trained observer. '24 The court followed this foundation with the
reminder that "any such special meaning must be articulated to
the courts and its reasonableness . . . assessed independently of
the police officers' subjective assertions. '2' The court held that the
necessary "particularized suspicion" was not objectively estab-
lished by the "mere presence of drug courier profile
characteristics. "26
The court discussed the adequacy of the particular factors upon
which the officer relied in this case. As may have been foreshad-
owed in Zimmerman, the court's reasoning included the observa-
tion that the profile characteristics "have no apparent relationship
to criminal activity. ' 27 Nor was there evidence of "an empirical re-
lationship between these characteristics and criminal behavior. '2
At best, the observations warranted the officer's hunch that this
21. 6 Va. App. 384, 369 S.E.2d 423 (1988) (en banc).
22. Id. at 387, 369 S.E.2d at 424.
23. The court suggested two sets of circumstances which could justify a stop of an auto-
mobile: 1) where there are "specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate inter-
ests require the seizure of the particular individual," or 2) where "the vehicle must be
stopped pursuant to a plan embodying explicitly, neutral limitations on the conduct of indi-
vidual officers." Id. (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
24. Id. at 388, 369 S.E.2d at 425.
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982)).
26. Id. (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980)), United States v. Haye, 825
F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Aguiar, 825 F.2d 39, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1987)).
27. Id. at 388, 369 S.E.2d at 425.
28. Id.
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particular car should be closely watched. The court concluded that
neither the drug courier profile nor the nervousness detected by
the officer provided a sufficient basis for the stop.2 9 Accordingly,
the stop and the subsequent search were illegal, and the evidence
should have been suppressed.30
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits
the warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.31 Similarly,
if an officer is able to observe an item in plain view, and has proba-
ble cause to believe the item to be seizable, he may enter the car to
seize the item.2 In Delong v. Commonwealth,"3 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that a gun was property seized from a car that
the police had stopped because it and its occupants matched the
description given by a witness to a shooting of a police officer. The
court also held that the officer's observations, made without in-
truding upon a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, were not
subject to the inadvertence requirement of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.s4
During the past year, the Virginia courts continued to adhere to
the rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject
only to a "few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions. ' 35 This adherence in some cases seems a guise wherein the
rule's recitation is followed by a balancing of law enforcement and
privacy interests to determine reasonableness.3 " Although the use
of a balancing approach in fourth amendment analysis is regretta-
ble, the Virginia Court of Appeals has included, commendably, in
its analysis a consideration of whether a particular search and
seizure is the lesser form of intrusion.3
29. Id. at 389, 369 S.E.2d at 425.
30. Id. Judge Cole, joined by Judge Hodges, wrote a lengthy dissent, including principles
and arguments fundamental to any thorough discussion of the issues posed by profile stops.
Unfortunately, such a treatment is beyond the scope of this survey.
31. See Derr v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 215, 368 S.E.2d 916 (1988).
32. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
33. 234 Va. 357, 362 S.E.2d 669 (1987).
34. 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see also Derr v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. at 222, 368 S.E.2d
at 919-20 (shining a flashlight into an automobile triggers no fourth amendment concerns
and does not render the plain view exception inapplicable).
35. See Crosby v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 193, 367 S.E.2d 730 (1988) (defendant's
acquiescence to a detective's statement that he intended to get a search warrant, did not
constitute consent to the search).
36. See Id. at 200-01, 367 S.E.2d at 735 (certain factors may weigh in favor of a warrant-
less entry to secure the premise of a place to be searched).
37. Id.
1988]
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The United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions
were not monumental. A person has no objectively reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in trash."8 Evidence discovered during an ille-
gal search is admissible if rediscovered during a subsequent execu-
tion of a search warrant, so long as the information gained during
the illegal search plays no part in the police officer's decision to
obtain a warrant or the magistrate's decision to issue one.39 An in-
vestigatory pursuit of a suspect is not a fourth amendment seizure
unless, by objective standards, the circumstances effect s restraint
on that individual's freedom to leave.40
Two Supreme Court decisions contained significant interrogation
holdings. Arizona v. Roberson,41 held that the invocation of the
right to counsel bars subsequent uncounseled police questioning
even as to unrelated crimes. Patterson v. Illinois42 held that the
attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel upon indict-
ment does not impose a per se ban on police-initiated, uncounseled
interrogation.
In Wass v. Commonwealth,3 the defendant made incriminating
statements to police officers during the execution of a search war-
rant on the defendant's residence. No Miranda warnings were
given by the police prior to questioning. Therefore, the issue was
whether the defendant "was in custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom in any significant way. ' '44
Because there was no dispute that the case involved an interro-
gation by the police, the Virginia Court of Appeals confined its
analysis to whether the defendant was in custody. The court stated
that this analysis must take into consideration the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether there existed, on an objective
basis, a "restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest. '4 The court considered ten factors: 1)
whether the defendant was questioned in familiar or neutral sur-
roundings; 2) the number of police present; 3) the degree of physi-
cal restraint; 4) the duration and character of interrogation; 5) the
38. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
39. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
40. Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988).
41. 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
42. 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
43. 5 Va. App. 27, 359 S.E.2d 836 (1987).
44. Id. at 31, 359 S.E.2d at 838.
45. Id. at 32, 359 S.E.2d at 839 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)).
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probable cause; 6) the manner in which the police officers directed
the defendant; 7) the extent to which the defendant was con-
fronted with evidence of his guilt; 8) the physical surroundings of
the interrogation; 9) the duration of the detention; and 10) the de-
gree of pressure applied to effect the detention.46
In Wass, the defendant admitted to the police that he under-
stood that he was not under arrest and "was free to go at any
time. ' 47 This fact was not dispositive of the issue. The court held
that by informing a suspect that he is not in custody, an officer
does not necessarily dispel the effect of other circumstances which
might "dictate a finding that custody exists. '48
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The double jeopardy protection provided by the fifth amend-
ment means that a defendant may not be tried twice for the same
offense. A lesser-included offense and the greater offense are the
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.49 These principles
were invoked by the defendant in Peterson v. Commonwealth."
Pursuant to a plea agreement reached while the case was in the
General District Court, the Commonwealth had reduced a felony
charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute to a
misdemeanor charge of possession. The defendant noted an appeal
to the Circuit Court (after changing counsel), and the Common-
wealth indicted her on the felony charge1.5  The Virginia Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court's dismissal of the double jeopardy
argument, holding that the defendant was not implicitly acquitted
of the felony charge.52
In Rogers v. Commonwealth,3 the defendant was acquitted by a
jury of a charge of abduction. A related charge of rape was tried at
46. Id. at 32-33, 359 S.E.2d at 839.
47. Id. at 31, 359 S.E.2d at 838.
48. Id. at 34, 359 S.E.2d at 840 (the number of armed officers, their manner of arrival,
and the methods used to secure Wass' house all contributed to his belief that he was not
free to leave).
49. Blackburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
50. 5 Va. App. 389, 363 S.E.2d 440 (1987).
51. Id. at 393, 363 S.E.2d at 443.
52. Id. at 398, 363 S.E.2d at 445. The court noted that special circumstances may permit
retrial. Id. at 398, 363 S.E.2d at 444; see, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987)
(plea agreement expressly stating that the government may reinstate more serious charges
under certain conditions is tantamount to a waiver of double jeopardy).
53. 5 Va. App. 337, 362 S.E.2d 752 (1987).
1988]
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the same time, but a mistrial was declared when the jury was una-
ble to reach a verdict. The rape charge was tried again over the
defendant's objection that the Commonwealth was collaterally es-
topped 54 from attempting to prove the necessary element of force
by the jury's acquittal on the charge of abduction.5 The court of
appeals affirmed the resulting conviction on the rape charge, rea-
soning that the jury may have considered the force and detention
accompanying the rape as incidental to the rape, and may have
based its verdict on the question of whether the victim had been
forced into the defendant's house.56
Federal and state prosecutions for the same offense do not vio-
late double jeopardy prohibitions. However, section 19.2-294 of the
Code of Virginia operates to bar a state prosecution if a defendant
can show that at the time the state prosecution is commenced,
there has been a federal prosecution or proceeding for the same
act.57 The state prosecution in Shilling was not barred because the
only federal action was the obtaining and execution of a federal
search warrant. The court found that this action was not a "pro-
ceeding" within the meaning of the statute. 8
III. DISCOVERY
Three opinions this past year involved the obligation of the
Commonwealth to divulge, upon request, evidence favorable to the
defendant. One of those cases, Walker v. Commonwealth,5 dealt
with the failure of the Commonwealth to disclose plea agreements
and prior inconsistent statements made by key Commonwealth
witnesses. The court held that the failure created a reasonable
probability that the outcome may have been different, and accord-
ingly, reversed the conviction. 0 The significant aspect of this case
is the fact that the defendant was able to elicit this information
during trial.
54. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) ("when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.").
55. Rogers, 5 Va. App. at 341, 362 S.E.2d at 754.
56. Id. at 343, 362 S.E.2d at 755.
57. See Shilling v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 500, 359 S.E.2d 311 (1987).
58. Id. at 504, 359 S.E.2d at 313-14. Even if the execution of a federal search warrant
was a proceeding, it was not procured for the same act but for possible subsequent viola-
tions. Id.
59. 4 Va. App. 286, 356 S.E.2d 853 (1987).
60. Id. at 300, 356 S.E.2d at 861; see also Whittington v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 212,
361 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
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As encouraging as Walker might be to advocates of meaningful
remedies for Brady violations,"1 the decision of the Virginia Su-
preme Court in Townes v. Commonwealth6 2 is an unfortunate il-
lustration of what the court does not view as exculpatory. In that
case, an eyewitness to a crime picked two "possibles," including
the defendant, from a photo array which she viewed four weeks
after her observations. Sometime later, she viewed a lineup which
included, of the two "possibles," only the defendant.63 She identi-
fied the defendant, who was tried and convicted.
The defendant did not learn of the witness' identification of two
"possibles" until the first day of trial. He assigned the Common-
wealth's reticence as error, arguing that the evidence was favorable
and should have been disclosed to him well before the commence-
ment of trial.6 4 The court found no merit to his argument, ques-
tioning whether the information was in fact exculpatory. The court
pointed out that the witness' identification was not a positive iden-
tification of the other person. Also, the jury might have believed
that the witness' selection of the two suspects "displayed com-
mendable caution on her part."65 The court resolved the issue by
holding that the defendant was not prejudiced because he was
given the information substantially in advance of the witness'
testimony.
61. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (failure of the state to furnish the defendant with any exculpatory
evidence it has in its possession).
62. 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987).
63. Id. at 314, 362 S.E.2d at 653-54. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the
witness' in-court identification as the product of an unduly suggestive identification proce-
dure. Id. at 329, 362 S.E.2d at 662. The court gave the issue short shrift. It distinguished
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) as "inapposite" with no explanation other than a
recitation of the facts. Id. at 330, 362 S.E.2d at 663. It cited United States v. Portillo, 633
F.2d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 1980), as authority for the proposition that due process is not
violated where an accused is "the only individual to appear in both [a] photospread and [a]
lineup." Id. at 330-31, 362 S.E.2d at 663. The court concluded its analysis with the rule of
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (listing the factors to be considered in evaluating the
liklihood of misidentification). Id.
Eyewitnesses testify without fail that their in-court identifications are based upon their
initial observations and not upon any intervening events. This testimony is not talismanic,
and defense counsel should pursue relevant inquiry on cross-examination. In Wise v. Com-
monwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 376 S.E.2d 197 (1988), cross-examination revealed that the wit-
ness's ceratinty was the result of the intervening, unconstitutionally suggestive, identifica-
tion procedures.
64. Townes, 234 Va. at 324, 362 S.E.2d at 659.
65. Id. at 324, 362 S.E.2d at 663.
1988]
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A similar ruling resulted in Taitano v. Commonwealth," which
involved the post-conviction discovery of a statement in the Com-
monwealth's possession of another witness to the crime. The de-
fendant argued that this version, although inculpatory, would have
contradicted the testimony of the Commonwealth's key eyewit-
ness.6 7 Not being convinced that the jury probably would have
reached another result, the court concluded that the possible im-
peachment benefit of the information was "insignificant."68
IV. UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
The general rule that prior or subsequent misconduct of an ac-
cused is inadmissible to prove predisposition to commit the crime
charged has a number of exceptions. However, a number of rever-
sals from the Virginia Court of Appeals demonstrates that the
Commonwealth pursues these exceptions with some peril. For in-
stance, in Henderson v. Commonwealth,69 the prosecutor offered
evidence of misconduct ostensibly to show motive, intent or knowl-
edge. The court of appeals viewed the real object of the evidence
differently, concluding that the evidence went instead to the issue
of identity or "commission of the act itself."7
Generally, a cautionary instruction will suffice to ensure that evi-
dence of misconduct is properly received and considered by the
jury. The giving of such an instruction, in clear and specific terms,
is not a matter of discretion for the trial court.7 1 However, where
the evidence of misconduct is inadmissible, a cautionary instruc-
tion might not be sufficient to cure the prejudice. In Terry v. Com-
monwealth,7 2 the Commonwealth introduced sufficient circumstan-
66. 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987).
67. Id. at 348, 358 S.E.2d at 593.
68. Id. at 351, 358 S.E.2d at 595. Undisclosed evidence is "material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome [of the trial]." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
668 (1985).
69. 5 Va. App. 125, 360 S.E.2d 876 (1987).
70. Id. at 129, 360 S.E.2d at 876. The court added that where identity was the issue for
which the misconduct was probative, the misconduct evidence must depict a distinctive mo-
dus operandi sufficient to place the defendant's "signature" on the crimes. Id. at 129-30, 360
S.E.2d at 879; see also Godwin v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 118, 367 S.E.2d 520 (1988)
(court erred in not severing trial of two factually similar robberies); Foster v. Common-
wealth, 5 Va. App. 316, 362 S.E.2d 745 (1987).
71. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 248, 257, 361 S.E.2d 634, 640 (1987).
72. 5 Va. App. 167, 360 S.E.2d 880 (1987).
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tial evidence to sustain a conviction of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. The most probative evidence of intent
was the inadmissable testimony of a detective that a search war-
rant was obtained following a controlled purchase by an inform-
ant .13 Despite the trial court's cautionary instruction, the evidence
may have influenced the jury, which might not have found the req-
uisite intent otherwise. 74
One of the most helpful opinions of the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals concerned the paradox familiar to defense counsel: deciding
whether it is worthwhile to "open the door" by offering evidence of
a defendant's good character. The upstanding citizens who invaria-
bly give this kind of testimony are tempting targets for the "have
you heard" form of cross-examination. The court of appeals
adopted invaluable criteria for trial courts to use in determining
whether prospective cross examination of a character witness is
proper. 5
A court would make four determinations before permitting a
prosecutor to confront a reputation witness with a rumor or sug-
gestion of past misconduct: 1) that there is no dispute as to the
fact of the subject matter of the rumor; 2) that a reasonable llkeli-
hood exists that the misconduct would have been the subject of
conversation; 3) that neither the event underlying the rumor nor
the rumor itself was too remote; and 4) that the underlying event
and the rumor concerning that even pertained to the character
trait in issue. The court then must ensure that the prosecutor em-
ploys proper "have you heard" form in his cross-examination and
further instruct the jury of the exact purpose of this kind of
questioning.7 6
73. Id. at 169, 360 S.E.2d at 881.
74. Id. In a similar vein, hearsay declarations of Barbara Evans-Smith, the murdered
wife of the defendant in Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 193, 361 S.E.2d
436, 439 (1987), were admitted under the state-of-mind exception along with an instruction
that the statements were offered only for the purpose of proving her fear of her husband.
Aside from the fact that the statements were immaterial and irrelevant, they also did not
reflect well on the defendant's character. Reasoning that it was "impossible to discern for
what purpose the remarks were received by the jury," and "to what extent the jury was
influenced by this prejudicial evidence," the court of appeals held that their admission con-
stituted reversible error. Id. at 200, 361 S.E.2d at 444.
75. Weimer v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 47, 54, 360 S.E.2d 381, 384-85 (1987).
76. Id. at 55, 360 S.E.2d at 384-85.
198
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V. TRIALS
The Virginia Court of Appeals has been equally helpful in estab-
lishing case law on a variety of procedural issues. The court consid-
ered a Batson" challenge in Taitano v. Commonwealth.78 In Reyn-
olds v. Commonwealth,7 9 the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the right to voir dire is disqualified, and explained the appellate
analysis of this issue. In McCormick v. City of Virginia Beach,80
the court reversed a conviction reached in a bench trial where the
trial court failed to obtain the defendant's express waiver of trial
by jury. The court ruled that this waiver and the trial court's and
Commonwealth's concurrence must be entered on the record.,1
An indictment may be amended at any time before the jury re-
turns a verdict or a judge finds the defendant guilty, so long as the
amendment does not change the nature and character of the
charged offense.8 2 Venue must be proved by direct or circumstan-
tial evidence.8" A concern for the well-being of the defendant and
the victim's peace of mind does not provide a sufficient foundation
for a denial of bail.8 4
Tentative, conditional, or provisional rulings, such as may be re-
sponsive to motions in limine, do not relieve parties of the require-
ment of contemporaneous objections.8 5 Motions to strike the Com-
77. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (a challenge claiming peremptory strikes of
jurors were racially motivated).
78. 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987). In a matter involving a black defendant and a
black victim, the Commonwealth's Attorney struck four blacks during jury selection. The
reasons he articulated for the strikes were that each of the persons struck lived near the
defendant, near the scene of the crime, or in a "high crime area." Additionally, he consid-
ered age, dress and demeanor. The court agreed that these factors were non-racial consider-
ations. Id. at 347, 358 S.E.2d at 563.
79. 6 Va. App. 157, 367 S.E.2d 176 (1988).
80. 5 Va. App. 369, 373, 363 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1987).
81. Id.; accord Wright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 303, 357 S.E.2d 547 (1987).
82. Chiang v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 13, 365 S.E.2d 778 (1988); cf. Commonwealth
v. Davis, 10 Vir. Cir. 320 (1987).
83. Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 366 S.E.2d 719 (1988).
84. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 225, 367 S.E.2d 742 (1988). This decision also
contains a discussion of the factors involved in bail determinations.
85. Harward v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 468, 474, 364 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1988); see also
Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987) (a capital murder appeal
involving a defendant who represented himself at trial). In Townes, the trial court made
sufficient inquiry into the defendant's decision and ability to waive his sixth amendment
right to counsel. This inquiry included a determination that the defendant understood the
requirement and importance of contemporaneous objections. Id. at 319, 362 S.E.2d at 656.
In view of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975), which held that self-
representation does not excuse a defendant from complying "with the relevant rules of pro-
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monwealth's evidence must be renewed at the conclusion of the
defendant's evidence where he wishes to challenge the sufficiency
of that evidence. 6 A motion to strike is not, however, the only
means by which the sufficiency of evidence may be challenged and
the issue preserved for appeal. A motion to set aside the verdict is
equally appropriate, even where the record does not indicate
whether the trial judge has ruled on that motion. The motion must
contain specific objections pertaining to the issue of sufficiency.8 7
The right of an accused to compulsory process is qualified. He
must be able to show that the testimony would be material and
favorable to his defense. 8
Ordinarily, a court may not hear testimony from a juror to im-
peach a verdict, even where the testimony concerns jury miscon-
duct. An exception exists where it appears that a jury may have
considered matters not in evidence, thus frustrating the defend-
ant's constitutional right to confrontation. 9 Affidavits submitted
in support of a motion for a new trial are not sufficient in them-
selves, but may create an affirmative duty on the trial court to in-
vestigate the alleged misconduct.90 This duty may require hearing
testimony from the jurors to determine if they might have been
influenced by the extraneous material."'
Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court and Virginia Court of Ap-
peals provided significant case law on evidentiary points common
to criminal practice. Because evidentiary matters are discussed
elsewhere,92 these cases are cited only for convenience.9 3
cedural and substantive law," the Virginia Supreme Court refused to consider those assign-
ments of error which were not properly preserved. Townes, 234 Va. at 319, 362 S.E.2d at
657; accord O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
86. Fields v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 229, 237, 361 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1987).
87. McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987); see also
Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 357 S.E.2d 742 (1987) (citing cases illustrative of
the rule that a motion is necessary to preserve the issue unless a miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result).
88. Howard v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 132, 367 S.E.2d 527 (1-988); see also United
States v. Vaenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
89. Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 206, 361 S.E.2d 436, 446 (1987).
90. Id. at 207, 361 S.E.2d at 447.
91. Id. at 206, 361 S.E.2d at 446.
92. Friend, Evidence: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RicH. L. REv. 621 (1988).
93. See Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263 (1988) (Rape Shield
law); Royal v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 403, 362 S.E.2d 323 (1987) (prior inconsistent state-
ments); Whittington v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 212, 361 S.E.2d 449 (1987) (after-discov-
ered evidence); Fields v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 229, 361 S.E.2d 359 (1987) (impeach-
ment); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 275, 356 S.E.2d 847 (1987) (use of transcript by
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VI. CRIMES
A. Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
The United States Supreme Court, in Baldasar v. Illinois,94 held
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to
convert a subsequently committed misdemeanor into a felony with
an enhanced punishment. In Sargent v. Commonwealth,95 the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals reached the same holding in a case involv-
ing an enhanced punishment for a third DUI conviction. Thus,
where the record was silent as to whether the defendant had been
represented on his earlier convictions or had waived counsel, those
convictions could not form the predicate for a conviction of a third
DUI offense. 6
A driver in this Commonwealth, if he is arrested for driving
under the influence, is presumed to consent to a blood or breath
test pursuant to section 18.2-268 of the Code of Virginia. Defend-
ants seeking to suppress the results of blood and breath tests often
challenge the validity of the underlying arrest, arguing, for exam-
ple, that the arrest was without probable cause or that it occurred
more than two hours after the offense. The case of Durant v. City
of Suffolk9 7 involved such a challenge. A police officer in Suffolk
saw the defendant driving in a manner that suggested that he was
under the influence of alcohol. Unable to stop the defendant in
Suffolk, the officer radioed the information to an Isle of Wight of-
ficer. This officer saw the defendant driving in Isle of Wight and
effected a warrantless arrest.98 Because the arrest was for a misde-
meanor not committed in the officer's presence, (driving under the
jury while listening to recorded conversation); Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438,
358 S.E.2d 415 (1987) (excited utterance exception).
94. 446 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
95. 5 Va. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
96. Id. at 149, 360 S.E.2d at 901. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Although the three month sentence
was well within the permissible range of punishment for a first time offense, the court noted
that the defendant was tried and convicted of a third offense and that evidence of the two
prior offenses was presented. Id. The court concluded that the defendant was sentenced to
three months because he had been convicted of a third offense. Thus, he received an en-
hanced sentence because of uncounseled convictions. This result, the court felt, was prohib-
ited. Id. at 153, 360 S.E.2d at 902.
97. 4 Va. App. 445, 358 S.E.2d 732 (1987).
98. Id. at 447, 358 S.E.2d at 733.
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influence in Suffolk), the arrest was invalid and the test results
inadmissible. 9
B. Conspiracy
In Barber v. Commonwealth,0 " the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of seemingly unrelated drug transactions in New Kent
County to prove a conspiracy in Henrico County. The issue on ap-
peal was whether the Commonwealth improperly joined two trans-
actions in its proof of one charge of conspiracy.10 1 The Virginia
Court of Appeals employed factors identified in United States v.
MacDougall:10 2 1) the time periods in which the activities occurred;
2) the offenses charged; 3) the location of the activities; 4) the
identity of the coconspirators; and 5) the acts or descriptions
which indicated the nature and scope of the activities. Applying
these factors, the court concluded that the jury could infer from
the totality of the circumstances that the Commonwealth had
demonstrated a single conspiracy and that the acts or transactions
in question were acts in furtherance of that single conspiracy.103
A single agreement may constitute multiple violations of the law,
where the defendant conspired to distribute marijuana, cocaine
and preludin. Separate sentences for each offense were affirmed.10 4
C. Drugs
Evidence that the defendant was holding a baby in whose
diapers was found cocaine was insufficient to show that the defend-
ant was aware of the presence of cocaine or that she intentionally
and consciously possessed cocaine. 1 5
In Graves v. Commonwealth,' 6 there was no evidence of the
weight of the marijuana which was the subject of multiple transac-
tions. As a result, the defendant could not be convicted of conspir-
ing to distribute more than one-half ounce.
99. Id. at 449, 358 S.E.2d at 734.
100. 5 Va. App. 172, 176, 360 S.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1987).
101. Id. at 177, 360 S.E.2d at 890.
102. 790 F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986).
103. Barber, 5 Va. App. at 179, 360 S.E.2d at 890-91. The court went further. The Com-
monwealth contended that activities in another county were evidence of a single conspiracy
in Henrico, and it tried the defendant separately in New Kent for those same activities. The
court found no significance to this inconsistency. Id. at 181 n.2, 360 S.E.2d at 893 n.2.
104. Wooten v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 89, 93, 368 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1988).
105. Hairston v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 183, 360 S.E.2d 893 (1987).
106. 234 Va. 578, 363 S.E.2d 705 (1988).
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D. Fraud and Embezzlement
In Watson v. Commonwealth,107 the defendant had been em-
ployed to care for his elderly victim. He obtained the victim's en-
dorsement on a check in the amount of $950, payable to a third-
party, marked "for services rendered." At trial for larceny by false
pretenses, the third-party testified that she performed no services.
The defendant testified that the check was for him, but had been
made payable to the third party so she would cash it because he
had lost his operators license. 10 8 The court affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction, noting that if the jury had believed the defendant,
then no false pretenses had occurred. 10 9 Because the jury did not
believe the defendant, his possession of the check could only be
explained by his having obtained it through a misrepresentation to
the victim that the third party had performed services for which
she had to be compensated.
In Waymack v. Commonwealth,'" a defendant's conviction for
embezzlement was reversed where the evidence failed to show that
she converted the missing funds (which she had received) to her
own use. It was also shown that other employees received funds in
the office, made accounting entries, and had access to the cash
drawer."'
To sustain a conviction of constructive fraud, the evidence must
show that the defendant had fraudulent intent at the time of the
contract."2
Gregory v. Commonwealth" 3 involved the crime of fraudulent
disposal of property on which a lien is given. In this type of case
the "fraud" is the act of the debtor which is designed to deprive a
secured creditor of his collateral. This fraudulent intent to dispose
of the secured property need not exist in Virginia."14
107. 4 Va. App. 450, 358 S.E.2d 735 (1987).
108. Id. at 451, 358 S.E.2d at 735.
109. Id. at 453, 358 S.E.2d at 736.
110. 4 Va. App. 547, 358 S.E.2d 765 (1987).
111. Id. at 550-51, 358 S.E.2d at 767.
112. Booth v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 484, 492, 358 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1987).
113. 5 Va. App. 89, 360 S.E.2d 858 (1987).
114. Id. at 93, 360 S.E.2d at 860.
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E. Murder
Section 19.2-264.2 of the Code of Virginia provides the sole crite-
ria by which a defendant convicted of capital murder may be sen-
tenced to death. Where the defendant is convicted of capital mur-
der pursuant to section 18.2-31(g) (multiple homicides), the
Commonwealth relies upon the "vileness" predicate for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. However, section 19.2-264.2 contains no
requirement that both or all of the homicides be vile.115
"Aggravated battery" for purposes of section 19.2-264.2 of the
Code of Virginia, means a battery "which, qualitatively and quan-
titively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accom-
plish an act of murder.""16 This "more culpable than the mini-
mum" standard does not require the Commonwealth to prove
either the order of the multiple gunshot wounds, or that death
might not otherwise have resulted. Factors to be considered are
whether there is an appreciable lapse of time between the first
wound and the last, and whether death results instantaneously
from the first. 1"
The evidence in Townes v. Commonwealth,"8 was that the de-
fendant was the last person seen in a convenience store before the
clerk was found dead and money was found to be missing. The
defendant objected to the court's instruction defining the elements
of robbery, stating that the instruction should require a finding
that the money was taken by him or on his behalf. He argued that
otherwise, the jury could have found him guilty of robbery, (and
thus, capital murder), even if they felt that a stranger had come
upon the scene after the killing and taken the money. The Virginia
Supreme Court was unimpressed by this argument, stating that
there was no evidence to support the defendant's speculative
theory." 9
In Wright v. Commonwealth,'2 ° the Virginia Supreme Court
held that although the first sentence of an instruction on voluntary
intoxication, offered by the defendant on trial for first degree mur-
115. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 138, 360 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1987).
116. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
44 U.S. 967 (1979).
117. Barnes, 234 Va. at 138, 360 S.E.2d at 203.
118. 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987).
119. Id. at 334-35, 362 S.E.2d at 665.
120. 234 Va. 627, 363 S.E.2d 711 (1988).
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der, was incomplete and misleading standing alone, the effect of
the remainder of the instruction was to state the law clearly and
accurately.121 The first portion of the instruction stated incorrectly
that intoxication is a defense to first degree murder. 22 The second
portion, however, cured the inaccuracy by further explaining that
intoxication may prevent the formulation of the specific intent
necessary to deliberate and premeditate. 123 Thus, the trial court
erred in refusing the instruction.124 The instruction which was
given and drafted sua sponte by the trial court was held "confus-
ing, inaccurate, and misleading."' 2 5 It did not cure the error of fail-
ing to give the defendant's instruction. 121
Evidence that the defendant was on parole at the time of the
crime is properly admitted during the penalty phase of a capital
murder trial as part of the "prior history" of the defendant.127
121. Id. at 630, 363 S.E.2d at 712.
122. Id. at 629, 363 S.E.2d at 712.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 630, 363 S.E.2d at 712.
125. Id. The instruction stated that:
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to murder or malicious wounding. Even if you
find that the defendant was so greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use of alcohol
that he was incapable of having the specific intent which is an element of this crime,
you must still find him guilty if you find that the Commonwealth has proven every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of first degree murder
proof of voluntary intoxication may negate deliberation and premeditation which is a
necessary element of that offense.
Id. at 630, 363 S.E.2d at 712-13.
126. Id. at 630, 363 S.E.2d at 713.
127. Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 126-27, 360 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1987).
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